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For the past two decades, the number of immigrants admitted to Canada has remained relatively stable 
while the number of workers admitted with a temporary work permit has steadily increased. This 
phenomenon is explained by a shift in Canadian public policies that direct the management of labour 
migration. Recent research has shed light on the complex and highly ramified transnational network that 
allows the recruitment of temporary foreign workers. Agricultural Guatemalan workers are hired through 
the Temporary Foreign Worker Program and the recruitment process is controlled by private recruitment 
intermediaries. Some abusive recruitment practices have been consistently reported. This article seeks to 
present the results of an empirical study documenting the recruitment by Quebec employers of Guatemalan 
agricultural workers and will discuss the normative framework regulating the recruitment of Guatemalan 
temporary foreign workers.  
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, le nombre de migrants admis au Canada est demeuré relativement 
stable, alors que le nombre de travailleurs admis avec un permis de travail temporaire a constamment 
augmenté. Ce phénomène s’explique par la modification des politiques publiques canadiennes qui ont 
facilité la gestion de la main-d’œuvre immigrante. De récentes recherches ont mis en lumière les 
ramifications complexes de réseaux transnationaux facilitant l’embauche de travailleurs étrangers 
temporaires. Les travailleurs agricoles guatémaltèques sont embauchés en vertu du programme des 
travailleurs étrangers temporaires et embauchés par l’entremise d’un processus de recrutement contrôlé par 
des intermédiaires privés. Des pratiques de recrutement abusives sont constamment rapportées. Cet article 
vise à présenter les résultats d’une étude empirique qui avait pour but de documenter le recrutement de 
travailleurs agricoles guatémaltèques par des employeurs québécois et évaluer le corpus normatif de 
régulation encadrant le recrutement de ces travailleurs. 
                                                 
*  Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau, professor, Faculty of Political Science and Law of the University of Quebec in 
Montréal (UQAM); Andréanne Thibault, LL.B (UQAM 2017) and M.A (UQAM 2015), UQAM; 
Nan Schivone, J.D. (Lewis & Clark Law School, 1998), Legal Director, Justice In Motion; 
Caroline Dufour, LL.B (Université de Sherbrooke, 2009) and LL.M (UQAM, 2016); Sarah Gouin, 
B.A. (UQAM, 2015) and LL.M student (UQAM), Nina Monjean, B.A. (UQAM, 2015) and LL.M 
(2016, Charles University, Prague); Éloïse Moses, LL.B (UQAM, 2017) and B.A. (UQAM, 2015). 
This research was supported by a research grant awarded by UQAMs’ Service aux collectivités, an 
institutional program supports collaborative research initiatives between community organizations and 
unions and researchers. This research also profited from the outreach resources of the Move 
Partnership: Employment-Related Geographical Mobility in the Canadian Context is a project of the 
SafetyNet Centre for Occupational Health & Safety Research at Memorial University. On the Move is 
supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council through its Partnership Grants 
funding opportunity (Appl ID 895-2011-1019), the Canada Foundation for Innovation, Innovate NL, 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, and numerous university and community partners in 
Canada and elsewhere. This article stems in part from research conducted for a clinical project at 
UQAM’s International Clinic for the Defense of Human Rights in collaboration with Justice in Motion 
(formerly Global Workers Justice Alliance). As such, the authors would like to thank Cathleen Caron, 
Executive director of Justice with Motion, Professor Mirja Trilsch, director of UQAM’s International 
Clinic for the Defense of Human Rights (CIDDHU). They would also like to thank the anonymous 
reviewers for their insightful comments. The authors are solely responsible for any errors or omissions. 
96 30.2 (2017) Revue québécoise de droit international 
En el curso de las dos últimas décadas, el número de inmigrantes admitidos en Canadá permaneció 
relativamente estable, mientras que el número de trabajadores admitidos con un permiso de trabajo 
temporal aumentó constantemente. Este fenómeno se explica por la modificación de las políticas 
canadienses públicas que facilitaron la gestión de la mano de obra inmigrante. Las investigaciones recientes 
pusieron en evidencia las ramificaciones complejas de redes transnacionales que facilitaban la contratación 
temporal de trabajadores extranjeros. Los trabajadores agrícolas guatemaltecos son contratados en virtud 
del programa de los trabajadores extranjeros temporales y contratados por la intervención de un proceso de 
contratación controlado por intermediarios privados.  Se reportan constantemente prácticas abusivas de 
contratación. Este artículo pretende presentar los resultados de un estudio empírico que tenía por objeto 
documentar la contratación de trabajadores agrícolas guatemaltecos por empleadores quebequeses y evaluar 
el corpus normativo de regulación que encuadra la contratación de estos trabajadores. 
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In Canada, a growing number of employers hire workers through various 
temporary migration programs (TMPs). Employers from the agricultural sector can 
hire workers through the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) or the 
Temporary Foreign Workers Program (TFWP), or under both programs. Unlike the 
SAWP, which is an intergovernmental agreement, the implementation of the TFWP 
does not require government participation and does not predetermine how or where 
the workers should be recruited. 
Pairing employers and workers across borders introduce what Philip Martin 
described as “an asymmetric information problem”. Thus, “the most efficient job-
matching institution is the one with maximum information: one that collects and 
shares information on employers seeking workers and workers seeking jobs.”
1
 
Pairings of this kind will generally be enabled by a third party, such as public 
employment services or for-profit private recruiters. The “job-finding and worker-
recruitment activities” are costly and “the general trend in the ʻmigrant recruitment 
business’ has been for costs to be shifted from employers to workers.”
2
 
In Canada, studies have shown that the choice of countries from which 
workers are recruited is a result of the strategies developed by private labour suppliers 
with whom employers’ contract.
3
 Indeed, employers rarely recruit temporary foreign 
workers (TFW) themselves. They generally contract with third parties, which offer a 
“turnkey” recruitment service. 
In Quebec, seasonal agricultural workers hired through the TFWP arrive 
mainly from Guatemala. In 2016, 4,606 Guatemalans were hired to work in Quebec; 
they represented 46% of all the agricultural TFW in Quebec.
4
 Guatemalan TFWs are 
recruited locally by private entities that carry out the recruitment and allocation of 
workers to specific employers. 
To date, little research has documented the abusive recruitment practices 
that TFWs are at risk of enduring.
5
 What is the nature of those practices? When 
unlawful practices are in place, to which regulatory framework can workers resort? 
                                                 
1
  Philip Martin, “Merchants of Various Types: Yesterday and Today” in Christiane Kuptsch, ed, 
Merchants of Labour (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 2006) 13 at 14. 
2
  Philip Martin, “Merchants of labor: Agents of the evolving migration infrastructure” (2005) 
International Institute for Labour Studies, Discussion Paper No DP1158/2005 at 3, online: ILO 
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---inst/documents/publication/wcms_193617.pdf. 
3
  Giselle Valazero, “Offloading Migration Management: The Institutionalized Authority of Non-State 
Agencies over the Guatemalan Temporary Agricultural Worker to Canada Project” (2015) 
16:3 International Migration and Integration 661. 
4
  FERME, “Bilan statistiqueˮ (2016), online: Fermequebec www.fermequebec.ca/programme-de-
travailleurs-etrangers-temporaires/#bilan. 
5
  See Fay Faraday, Profiting from the Precarious: How recruitment practices exploit migrant workers 
(Toronto, Metcalf Foundation, 2014), online: Metcalffoundation https://metcalffoundation.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Profiting-from-the-Precarious.pdf [Faraday, Profiting from]; Sarah Zell, 
“Contracting out accountability? Third-Party agents in temporary foreign worker recruitment to British 
Columbia” (2011), in Eugenie Depatie-Pelletier & Khan Rahi, eds, Mistreatment of temporary foreign 
workers in Canada: overcoming regulatory barriers and realities on the ground (Montreal: Centre 
Métropolis du Québec — Immigration et métropoles, 2011) 27. 
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This article seeks to present the results of an empirical study of the recruitment 
of Guatemalan agricultural workers by Quebec employers. Before detailing this 
research and its implications (II), we first contextualize our research question (I). 
Finally, we discuss the legal framework that is applicable to the recruitment of 
TFWs (III). 
 




The use of recruitment intermediaries is now quite common in several 
contexts
7
 and some believe that the involvement of these entities has introduced new 
sources of vulnerability for TFWs.
8
 Recruiters who pair workers and jobs are paid for 
their services, sometimes by employers or workers and often by both: these 




collect fees from migrants for non-existent jobs, mislead migrants regarding 
expected earnings or their prospects for achieving landed immigration 
status, provid[e] contracts that are poorly translated or inconsistent with the 
one held by the employer, overcharg[e] for transportation, housing, 
translation services, or [for] obtaining an extension of their work permit.10 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has expressed concern about 
“the growing role of unscrupulous employment agencies, informal labour 
intermediaries and other operators acting outside the legal and regulatory framework 
[sometimes leading] to debt bondage linked to repayment of recruitment fees.”
11
 
Gordon’s analysis of the “transnational human supply chain” reveals the forces 
driving the recruitment process, and stresses that “labor migration is a fundamental 
aspect of production in the global economy—as fundamental as the outsourcing of 




                                                 
6
  This expression has been coined by Jennifer Gordon, “Regulating the Human Supply Chain” 
(2017) 102:2 Iowa Law Review 445 [Gordon]. 
7
  See Aziz Choudry & Mostafa Henaway, “Agents of Misfortune: Contextualizing Migrant and 
Immigrant Workers’ Struggle Against Temporary Labour Recruitment Agencies” (2012) 45:1 Labour, 
Capital and Society 36; Guy Davidov, “Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment 
Relationships” (2004) 42:4 British Journal of Industrial Relations 727; Véronique De Tonnancour & 
Guylaine Vallée, “Les relations de travail tripartites et l’application des normes minimales du travail au 
Québec” (2009) 64:3 Relations industrielles 399.  
8
  See Philip Martin, Merchants of Labor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 99, ff [Martin, 
Merchants of Labor]; Faraday, supra note 5. 
9
  Martin, supra note 8 at 101.  
10
  Kerry Preibisch, “Migrant Workers and Changing Work-place Regimes in Contemporary Agricultural 
Production in Canada” (2011) 19:1 Int. Jrnl. of Soc. of Agr. & Food 62 at 74. 
11
  ILO, “Fair Recruitment Initiativeˮ, (30 March 2015), online: ILO www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ 
public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_320405.pdf.  
12
  Gordon, supra note 6 at 469. 
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In Canada, very few empirical studies have been carried out on that 
recruitment process. Some have documented the plight of workers who are sometimes 
charged extortionate fees by private recruiters and forced to take out thousands of 
dollars in loans and sign away the deeds of their homes.
13
 Some have reported the 
case of recruitment agents charging workers up to $15,000 CAN,
14
 forcing employees 
to fork out half of their annual pay to recruiters.
15
 Workers have been promised 




Although the core actors in the recruitment process are workers, recruiters 
and employers, the international recruitment process often involves a chain of 
subcontracting arrangements.
17
 This is exemplified in Quebec by the way 
the Agricultural Stream of the TFWP is implemented. Most agricultural sector 
employers use the services of a private entity to assist them in recruiting seasonal 
workers.
18
 Such entities do not directly select or recruit workers; those tasks are 
carried out by recruiters operating abroad. In Quebec, the Fondation des entreprises 
de recrutement de main-d’œuvre étrangère (FERME) plays a key role. FERME is a 
non-profit organization that offers its labour movement and human resources 
management services to employers who hire TFWs. In 2010, FERME began to 
transfer employers’ requests to Amigo Laboral, a private recruiter located in 
Guatemala.
19
 In 2017, those responsibilities seem to have been re-assigned to 
                                                 
13
  Humera Jabir, “Ottawa's overhaul ignores abuse of migrant workers”, The Toronto Star (2 July 2014), 
online: TheStar  
 www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2014/07/02/ottawas_overhaul_ignores_abuse_of_migrant_wo
rkers.html; Special To Financial Post, “Recruiters charging foreign workers in Ontario illegal fees as 
high as $12,000 for jobs that might not exist, report findsˮ, Financial Post (10 April 2014), online: 
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  Krystle Alarcon, “Law Leaves Migrant Workers Dangling Precariouslyˮ, The Tyee (9 January 2013), 
online:  https://thetyee.ca/News/2013/01/09/Migrant-Worker-Laws/ [The Tyee]. 
15
  UFCW Canada, “The Status of Migrant Farm Workers in Canada 2010-2011ˮ Report at 11, 




  Sarah R. Champagne, “Des travailleurs agricoles guatémaltèques disent avoir perdu des milliers de 
dollars”, Le Devoir (3 October 2017), online: LeDevoir www.ledevoir.com/societe/509457/une-
agence-sous-enquete-et-poursuivie-par-17-travailleurs-toujours-en-activite;; Financial Post, supra 
note 13; Alarcon, supra note 14. 
17
  Gordon, supra note 6 at 469, ff. 
18
  We have previously documented the contours of the recruitment network that is active in Guatemala. 
See Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau, “The Recruitment of Guatemalan Agricultural Workers by Canadian 
Employers: Mapping the Web of a Transnational Network”, (2014) 1:3 International Journal of 
Migration and Border Studies 291 [Gesualdi-Fecteau, The Recruitment]; Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau, “Le 
système d’emploi des travailleurs agricoles saisonniers: portrait d’un rapport salarial multipartite” 
(2016) 71:4 Relations industrielles 611. 
19
  It is important to point out that before 2010, FERME had an agreement with the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM). It is also the IOM who initiated this relationship in 2003 at the 
request of the Government of Guatemala to facilitate the recruitment of Guatemalan workers by 
Canadian employers. But in 2010, the IOM decided to increase their fees. This decision prompted 
FERME to cease contracting with the IOM and motivated the liaison agency to create Amigo Laboral. 
For an overview of the role of the IOM, see Ishan Ashutosh & Alison Mountz, “Migration 




If recruiters operating abroad handle recruitment on behalf of employers, 
legally, no contractual relationship exists between the employer and those recruiters: 
at the recruitment stage, the relationship between employers and recruiters operating 
abroad is established through FERME. Conversely, before their arrival in Canada, 
Guatemalan workers only deal with the recruiter operating in Guatemala, which 
assists workers with all the administrative procedures required by the Canadian 
authorities. 
But concretely, how does the recruitment of Guatemalan TFWs work in 
practice? An empirical study conducted in 2015 gives an insight into the perspective 
of Guatemalan TFWs hired through the Agricultural stream of the TFWP. 
 
II. Documenting recruitment practices of guatemalan TFWs : 
results from an empirical study 
We sign a document that we don’t understand. Still, we sign and we come 
to Canada to work. Our mentality is, it’s all ok, because we are going to 
work in Canada.21 
This quote encapsulates with eloquence the way Guatemalan TFWs 
generally perceive the recruitment process. Their apprehension of their recruitment 
“journey” is inextricably linked to their primary goal, which is to obtain employment 
through the Agricultural Stream of the TFWP. While the workers attach little 
importance to the administrative formalities surrounding their recruitment, their 
experience of the different steps that lead them to an employment opportunity sheds 
light on the recruitment process. 
Before presenting the results of our research (B), we will first explain the 
methodology used in the collection of data and discuss the different challenges that 
the research team faced in the field (A). We will conclude this section by discussing 
the implications of these research results (C). 
 
A. Research methodology 
The research findings presented here stem from a field study conducted 
between June and November 2015 which sought to document the recruitment of 
Guatemalan workers hired through the Agricultural Stream of the TFWP. It combines 
both a qualitative and a quantitative approach. We first conducted three focus groups 
                                                 
management for the benefit of whom? Interrogating the work of the International Organization for 
Migration” (2011) 15:1 Citizenship Studies 21. 
20
  FERME, “Cultiver des liens, Rapport d’activités 2016” (2016) at 2, online: FermeQuebec 
www.fermequebec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/RA_FERME_2016_Web.pdf. 
21
  See the text accompanying note 23, I-4 at 5. 
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with Guatemalan Agricultural workers;
22
 we subsequently conducted five individual 
semi-directed interviews with workers.
23
 The interviews, all conducted in Spanish 
with non-unionized workers, allowed us to reach a comprehensive understanding of 
the recruitment practices experienced by the respondents. 
We then sought to measure the recurrence of different phenomena identified 
in the interviews. We surveyed a total of 87 workers: 15 respondents worked in 
unionized workplaces and 72 were non-unionized. This data collection was enabled 
by the Agricultural workers Alliance and UFCW, local section 501. Throughout the 
data collection phase, the research team kept a detailed logbook of their findings. 
It is important to emphasize that the issue of recruitment practices appears to 
be, for these workers, a “sensitive topic”. Seiber and Stanley define “socially sensitive 
research” as research whose outcome is susceptible of having consequences or 
implications on the participants or the social group represented by the research.
24
 The 
indications that workers were dealing with a sensitive topic were evident throughout 
the data collection phase. 
In order to meet the requirements of research ethics, each worker who 
participated in a semi-directed interview was required to sign a consent form.
25
 The 
workers were given adequate time to read the form and the research team made sure 
to be available to answer their questions. All respondents were aware that they could 
withdraw from the research at any moment. 
In several cases, the consent form, in and of itself, was an obstacle: workers 
were reluctant to give their identity despite the guarantee of anonymity. Some 
workers, who had initially expressed interest in the research, wished to withdraw 
when presented with the consent form. The carrying out of the survey generated its 
own challenges. Several workers seemed uncomfortable with the issues addressed in 





                                                 
22
  These are referred to here as FG-1 to FG-3. 
23
  These are referred to here as I-1 to I-5. 
24
  Joan E. Sieber & Barbara Stanley, “Ethical and professional dimensions of socially sensitive research” 
(1988) 43:1 American Psychologist 49 at 49.  
25
  The consent form signed by the workers contained the following: “The information you provide will be 
kept confidential. No information that you may provide will be used in such a way that your identity 
will be revealed. Your anonymity will also be preserved. Your identity will be protected by an alpha-
numeric code (eg I-1: individual worker, respondent 1) to which the researcher will refer in his work. 
The key of this code will be constituted and known only by the research team. No information 
identifying you in any way will be published in the articles, publications or communications that will 
result from this research or will be communicated in the exchanges between the research team and 
other researchers. The content of the interview will be transcribed without any reference being made to 
information that could lead to your identification. Respondent records and personal information will be 
destroyed five (5) years after the completion of the study. Only the depersonalized transcripts may be 
retained by the researcher after that date. These will be kept in a secure and locked place in the 
researcher's office.” 
26  In order not to skew our results, we systematically counted the number of blanks. 
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It is also worth noting that several workers did not understand the content of 
the survey, either because their level of Spanish was insufficient or because they 
could not read or write. In those cases, the research team had to assist workers without 
diverging from the content of the questionnaire; the research team therefore adjusted 
the timeline of the field study. 
The participants surveyed were all men aged between 22 and 50. The great 
majority (65%) were between 23 and 36 years old. Participants were from various 
rural areas of Guatemala,
27
 but most of them were from Chimaltenango (36%), a 
region located about 50 kilometers away from Guatemala’s capital, Guatemala City. 
Some of our previous research revealed that recruiters favour the rural areas of 
Guatemala because of the high density of experienced agricultural workers; it would 
also appear that recruitment agents are instructed to prioritize “the most 
underprivileged” areas of Guatemala.
28
 
In terms of native language spoken, 61% of respondents stated their first 
language as Spanish and 32% responded that their first language was one of the 
several indigenous Mayan languages that are spoken in different parts of Guatemala.
29
 
In total, 26% of respondents were participating in the program for the first time, 13% 
were going to Canada for the second time, 10% were participating for the fourth time 
and 10% were participating for the fifth time. 
The data collection allowed the research team to identify certain patterns in 
the recruitment practices experienced by workers. 
 
B. Who, how and how much? mapping the recruitment practices of 
Guatemalan agricultural workers  
The Agricultural Stream of the TFWP allows employers to recruit seasonal 
agricultural workers who will work on an employer’s premises abroad. Our previous 
research revealed that, from a practical standpoint, it is the private recruiters operating 
abroad who select the workers.
30
 These recruiters first create a “pool” of workers 
according to general criteria. Once a worker is selected, recruiters will pair workers 
and employers according to the specific “demands” of the employer; some employers 
will specify that they need young workers; others will request, for example tall men. 
For tasks requiring good dexterity, such as berry picking, some employers tend to 
request female workers. We have previously argued that these practices imply a form 
of outsourced discrimination, which is carried out by recruiters on behalf of 
employers. 
                                                 
27
  Alta Verapaz (11%), Chichicastenango (9%), El Progreso (10%), Chimaltenango (36%), Jutiapa (5%), 
Sacatepequez (8%), San Marcos (7%), Santa Rosa (2%), Tacana San Marcos (1%), Tecpan (1%), 
Zaragoza (1%).  
28
  Gesualdi-Fecteau, supra note 18 at 297. 
29
  These respondents either spoke Kaqchikel (18%), Chichi (1%), Quiché (8%) or Q’eqchi (5%) as a first 
language. 
30
  Gesualdi-Fecteau, supra, note 18. 
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The empirical evidence collected in 2015 gives us (a) a better understanding 
of the extent to which employment through the TFWP is formalized and (b) gives us 
an idea of the human cost for TFWs seeking work in Canada. 
 
1. HOW? THE FORMALIZATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROCESS THROUGH THE 
TFWP 
Once a worker is selected and assigned to a specific employer, the employer 
and the employee are bound by an employment contract. The employment is 
“formalized” when the workers sign the employment contract: nearly all the 
respondents (98%) signed the contract while they were in Guatemala, with a 
representative of the recruiter present. All respondents to our study dealt with Amigo 
Laboral. Some were originally hired by the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), which did recruitment for Quebec employers until 2010. The respondents 
were “transferred” to Amigo Laboral in 2010. 
A contract of employment is a contract by which a person, the employee, 
“undertakes, for a limited time and for remuneration, to do work under the direction 
or control of another person, employer.”
31
 Employment and Social Development 
Canada (ESDC) provides employment contract templates for use by employers when 
hiring workers through the Agricultural Stream of the TFWP.
32
 The parties to the 
employment contract (which must be signed by both parties) must define therein the 
working conditions of the TFW, including the duration of employment. 
Most respondents appear to have signed the contract in the Amigo Laboral 
offices (84%). Nevertheless, some respondents said they signed the contract at the 
airport before leaving Guatemala (8%). In total, 56% of them said they never received 
a copy of their contract. Only 48% signed a Spanish version of the document; many 
respondents were only presented with an English or a French version of the contract.
33
 
The semi-directed interviews that were first conducted gave us an idea of the 
context in which Guatemalan workers become aware of their employment contract. 
No interviewee received information about the content of the contract: they were all 
just asked to sign the document. Some of the respondents also told the research team 
that they were not given enough time to read the contract.
34
 As illustrated by one 
worker, “they make an X and you have to sign and sign and sign…But you cannot 
read... If one wishes to read, they will be told: “Gentlemen, here is the X.” And that is 
it for the papeleria (paperwork).”
35
 
                                                 
31
  Art 2085 CCQ. 
32
  Employment and Social Development Canada, “Agricultural Stream — Contract Template”, ESDC 
Form No EMP5510 (Ottawa: ESDC, January 2018), online: Service Canada  
 https://catalogue.servicecanada.gc.ca/apps/EForms/pdf/en/ESDC-EMP5510.pdf  
 [ESDC, Agricultural Stream]. 
33
  See ibid, FG-1 at 11; FG-3 at 10; I-1 at 6; I-3 at 8; I-4 at 5; I-5 at 4. 
34
  This could probably explain why some of the respondents (7%) did not know how to respond to the 
question about the language in which the contract was written. 
35
  Employment and Social Development Canada, supra note 32, FG-1 at 12. 
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2. HOW MUCH? THE COST OF A CANADIAN EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
In Canada, the federal immigration normative framework is shaped by 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
36
 and its regulations.
37
 One of the 
objectives of the IRPA is “[...] to facilitate the entry of [...] temporary workers for 
purposes such as trade, commerce, tourism, international understanding and cultural, 
educational and scientific activities.”
38
 The IRPA provides that the “alien” must 
request and obtain from the Canadian Visa Office, visas and other required 
documents; the “visa or document may be issued if, following an examination, the 
officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the 
requirements of this Act.”
39
 The visa costs $155.00 CAN. In addition to the visa, 
workers seeking work in Quebec must obtain a Certificate of acceptance of Quebec, 
which costs $191.00 CAN.
40
 
Guatemalan workers must also undergo a medical examination.
41
 The costs 
of this examination are borne by the worker. The medical examination fee is not set 
by the Canadian government and is therefore likely to vary. 
In 2015, respondents paid an average amount of 3,500Q (+/$- 600.00 CAN) 
to the recruiter for the required papeleria. Workers that had returned to Guatemala for 
less than 6 months between contracts were not required to pass a medical exam and 
were therefore required to pay an average amount of 2,600Q (+/$- 450.00 CAN).
42
 
Where respondents could not specifically identify the exact break-down of 
different costs, the semi-directed interviews revealed that several respondents knew 
that the total amount included the payment for health insurance which costs between 
280Q and 300Q (+/$- 50.00 CAN);
43
 this health insurance plan was put forward by 
Amigo Laboral as of 2010. While they were told that this insurance was aimed at 
“protecting their family,”
44
 many respondents told us that the insurance was, in fact, 
useless.
45
 The insurance was even deemed pointless in several areas of Guatemala 
where there are no service providers.
46
 For others, it was not worth resorting to this 
insurance because they still had to dar una cuota
47
 (pay a fee) when attending a 
medical consultation. The survey revealed that most respondents believed they could 
not decline this insurance (70%) and 11% thought the insurance was mandatory.
48
 
                                                 
36
  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, RSC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. 
37
  Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR]. 
38
  IRPA, supra note 36, s 3(1)(g). 
39
  Ibid, s 11(1).  
40
  Regulation respecting the selection of foreign nationals, CQLR, c I-0.2, r 4, s 3. 
41
  IRPR, supra note 37, s 30(1)(c). Workers will be dispensed of the formality if their return to Guatemala 
between their professional sojourns to Canada of for less than 6 months 
42
  Employment and Social Development Canada, supra note 32, FG-3 at 5. The workers estimate that the 
medical examinations costs +/- 800 to 850Q (+/- 140.00$ CAN to 150.00$ CAN). 
43
  Ibid, FG-1 at 7; I-2 at 7. 
44
  Ibid, FG-1 at 7. 
45
  Ibid, FG-3 at 7; I-2 at 7.  
46
  Ibid, FG-1 at 8. 
47
  Ibid, I-4 at 4. 
48
  2% did not know and 16% did not answer the question. 59% of the respondents did not seem to know 
why they couldn’t decline the insurance plan. 
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36% of the respondents stated that they had paid “cargos administrativosˮ 
(“administrative fees”) to Amigo Laboral in return for their work. In addition to such 
“administrative fees”, 9% of respondents stated that they also had to pay a fee to a 
“middle person.”
49
 The “middle person” is not an official agent of Amigo Laboral. 
According to our data, the middle person can be an individual that has ties with the 
company’s staff (a friend or an ex colleague for instance). This “middle person” 
promises a TFW that “he will get him hired”. Other respondents witnessed situations 
in which colleagues paid fees to a “middle person” who seemed to be tied to 
employers in Canada. Thus, a “middle person” can either be an individual somewhat 
associated with Amigo Laboral or one that is linked to employers in Canada. 
Some workers seem to believe that the involvement of a “middle person” is 
inevitable, perhaps even mandatory. Here is how one of our respondents described the 
situation: 
In the office [Amigo Laboral’s], they say, workers should not have to pay 
money [to a middle person]. But one is forced to pay [a middle person], 
because if you go to the office [of Amigo Laboral in Guatemala City] 
looking for information, they won’t give it to you. You must go as 
recommended by “x” persons from different [Guatemalan] departments 
who have contacts with office workers [Amigo Laboral].50 
Thus, such a “recommendation” comes at a cost. One worker told the 
research team that the first time he came to Canada, he paid 10,000Q (+/$- 
1,750.00 CAN) to a “middle person” without any assurance that he would effectively 
obtain employment.
51
 The same respondent also paid a hefty sum on a second 
occasion because he was not rehired by the employer. Here is how he summed up his 
experience: 
In 2010, I had to pay the amount of 10,000Q. In 2011 the greenhouse fired 
me, we learned that the employer changed its staff for Hondurans. Since I 
was not rehired, I waited. Suddenly I got a call from the same middle 
person who charged me in 2010. He asked for 15,000 Q. To keep my family 
well-being, I had to come up with that money, and come here [to work]. 
Since the same company rehired me since then, I no longer had pay out that 
sum of money.52 
Several other respondents reported similar experiences. One told the research 
team that many workers had to pay around 15 000Q (+/$- 2,600.00 CAN) to a middle 
person to “secure a place in the program” with no guarantee of obtaining 
employment.
53
 A respondent also reported that some of his colleagues had made 
“confidential payments” up to 15,000Q to a “middle person” and that the sum was 
                                                 
49
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supposedly shared between the middle person and the Amigo Laboral staff.
54
 The 
research team was also told that some workers have, in the past, paid agents of Amigo 
Laboral who, in return, promised to secure them “a place in the program.”
55
 
All respondents interviewed, none of which said they were from the capital 
city, told us that the cost of traveling to the capital to complete all the administrative 
formalities was substantial: some respondents had to go to the capital several times, 
sometimes up to nine times.
56
 In addition to the transportation costs, which vary 
greatly according to where they reside in Guatemala, workers must pay for 
accommodation and food. Most respondents therefore had to disburse from 1,000Q to 
2,000Q (+/- $175,00 CAN to $350.00 CAN),
57
 some had to spend up to 7,500Q to 
8,500Q (+/$- 1,300.00 CAN to $1500.00 CAN).
58
 
Considering that the average monthly wage in Guatemala was 2,131Q 
(roughly $380 CAN) in 2016,
59
 how do workers manage to meet those expenses? 
Several respondents had to take out a loan to cover those fees, a loan that often came 
with interest. To be able to pay the recruitment and procedure fees, 56% of 
respondents stated that they had to take out a loan, either from a friend (20%), a 
family member (15%) or a financial institution (11%)
60
. 32% of the respondents who 
borrowed money also paid interest to their lender. 18% also stated that they had to 
provide the lender the deeds to their property as a guarantee. 
 
C. A story of debts and broken promises: research implications 
These research findings raise a number of questions. What are the impacts of 
the recruitment process, a system in which employees have little control? Are the 
recruitment expenses that workers incur likely to affect behaviours during sojourns 
in Quebec? What are we to read into the workers’ discomfort in relation to the 
research topic? 
 Although surveyed workers were not required to disclose their identity, 
numerous respondents feared that the disclosure of information about the recruitment 
process would have negative consequences. Some respondents were afraid of being 
identified and being reported to employers or recruiters. Several TFWs were reluctant 
to take part in the survey and who did agree often needed reassurance. 45% of the 
respondents did not identify their moneylenders. The research team also detected a 
certain degree of “collective insincerity”
61
 while conducting the focus groups. Some 
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  Jean Carbonnier, Sociologie juridique, 2nd ed (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004) at 209. 
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workers were reluctant to give a point of view that diverged from the standpoint of 
their colleagues. When a respondent led the interview, the other respondent generally 
simply confirmed the viewpoint expressed by their colleague. Workers were also 
reluctant to complete the survey in the presence of other colleagues. 
The fear generated by the research topic should be understood in the wider 
context of the recruitment process. Our data reveals that workers have very little time 
to familiarize themselves with their contract, which is sometimes written in a 
language they do not speak or read. Moreover, many workers do not clearly 
understand the legal tenor of the document they are requested to sign. Survey 
questions regarding the date and place of the contract’s signing, the language of the 
contract, the existence of explanations regarding the details of the contract and the 
possibility of obtaining a copy of the contract were not well understood by workers: 
several respondents recalled signing a paper but did not know what it was. While 70% 
of them said they received some information about the content of the contract, it was 
not always clear if they were talking about the written information contained in the 
contract itself or if it was information they received orally in a pre-departure 
information session. 
Thus, workers soon realize the degree of “conditionality” surrounding their 
employment in Canada.
62
 Their sojourn as well as their employment contract is 
temporary and of fixed duration. Workers must be paired with employers who have 
previously been authorized to hire TFWs. Our data suggests that the recruitment 
process reinforces a feeling of conditionality. One respondent mentioned that he 
believed workers are afraid to ask questions of recruiters; he had personally witnessed 
colleagues who had been “kicked out of the program” after complaining about the 
process.
63
 Many respondents expressed discontent and resented the fact they paid 
money to the recruiter while “not being well treated.”
64
 The lack of transparency in 
the hiring process along with the practices engaged in by the recruiter cast workers as 
“passive subjects” who must abide by the process imposed by the recruiter and avoid 
voicing their discontent. 
Our results also reveal that, in 2015, Guatemalan TFWs hired by Quebec 
employers paid an average amount of 3,500Q (+/$- 600.00 CAN) to recruiters while 
abroad. In addition to fees that the TFWP requires TFWs to pay,
65
 Guatemalan 
workers are required to pay an “administrative fee” and a health insurance 
contribution to recruiters, considered “useless” by most respondents to be; some also 
have to pay a “middle person”. Several respondents had to take out a loan to pay for 
those fees, loans upon which interest was often owed. 
Fees and debt often incurred throughout the recruitment process are likely to 
impact on the strategies deployed by Guatemalan TFWs during the course of their 
                                                 
62
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employment in Quebec. Previous research has shown that TFWs often self-discipline 
and adjust their behaviour to ensure the continuation of their employment; TFWs are 
generally not inclined to mobilize their labour rights.
66
 TFWs wish to comply with the 
expectations, real or perceived, of different actors, such as those held by employers or 
recruiters; TFWs often internalize that they must “behave” if they wish to keep their 
jobs.
67
 Thus, if TFWs are indebted, it is very unlikely that they will voice concerns 
about their working conditions or do anything that might, in their eyes, jeopardize 
their employment. 
Given these findings and in light of the central role played by recruiters, it is 
necessary to take a look at the legal framework regulating the recruitment of TFWs. 
The fact that TFWs recruitment is transnational in nature poses a serious challenge to 
its regulation. 
 
III. The regulation of the recruitment of temporary foreign 
workers: a normative conundrum? 
As aforementioned, in Canada, the federal immigration framework is shaped 
by the IRPA and its regulations. One of the objectives of the IRPA is “[...] to facilitate 
the entry of [...] temporary workers for purposes such as trade, commerce, tourism, 
international understanding and cultural, educational and scientific activities.”
68
 
However, in Canada, labour relations fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
provinces; the Federal Parliament has exceptional jurisdiction over employment 
relations in worplaces that fall under its jurisdiction. Thus, each Canadian province 
has developed its own labour legal framework. Hence, some provinces explicitly 
address the activities of recruiters. Their regulation may also be governed by the 
normative and administrative frameworks of the various countries in which they 
operate. 
This brief overview illustrates the manner in which the recruitment of TFWs 
is at the heart of a normative conundrum. In this section, we will shed light on the 
framework applicable to the recruitment of TFWs. After presenting the (A) Canadian 
legal framework, we will examine (B) how the Código de Trabajo de Guatemala
69
 
specifically tasks the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare with the protection 
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of Guatemalan workers’ rights abroad. This section concludes with reflections on how 
best to address the legal challenges posed by this normative conundrum. 
 
A. Exploring the nature and scope of the Canadian legal framework: a 
fragmented landscape 
Although the IRPA and its regulations are aimed at facilitating the entry of 
temporary workers, it does not specifically address recruitment issues. 
Notwithstanding, the website of ESDC provides an employment contract template 
that employers should use when hiring seasonal agricultural workers through the 
TFWP.
70
 The template states that the “employer shall not recoup from the temporary 
foreign worker, through payroll deductions or any other means, any costs incurred 
from recruiting […] the temporary foreign worker. This includes […] any amount 
payable to a third-party representative/recruiter.”
71
 However, this provision does not 
foresee expenses incurred by TFWs but rather those incurred by the employer. 
In Canada, each Canadian provinces all have their own specific labour 
legislation. Thus, in many provinces, recruitment issues are addressed by labour law, 
which can regulate the activities of the temporary staffing business (employment 
agencies or employment bureaus) that engage in recruitment activities and provide 
workers for client companies.
72
 
Up until June 2018, of all the Canadian provinces, Quebec was the one in 
which the activities of recruiters are the least regulated. Apart from the Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms,
73
 which states that employment bureaus cannot engage 
in discrimination, Quebec’s labour legislation did not oversee the activities of the 
staffing industry. In June 2018, the Act to amend the Act respecting labour standards 
and other legislative provisions mainly to facilitate family-work balance requires 
temporary work agencies and recruitment agencies for temporary foreign workers to 
hold a licence and provides for the implementation of regulations concerning such 
agencies. Thus, these provisions will enter into force when a regulation detailing the 
nature of scope of the obligations of such agencies will be introduced
74
.   
Manitoba’s legislation is more complete and detailed. Section 2(1) of the 
Worker Recruitment and Protection Act states that any person engaging an 
“employment agency businessˮ in the province must be in possession of a licence, 
unless they fall under an exemption.
75
 The Manitoban legislation also states that all 
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foreign worker recruiters must have a licence. If they were to hire without a licence, 
recruiters could be subject to substantial fines ranging from $25,000, in the case of an 
individual, to $50,000, in the case of a corporation.
76
 Recruiters must also provide a 
large quantity of information when registering, such as the name and address of their 
clients, the business number of their clients, the name and address of every worker 
hired, information about positions filled by the worker, “etc.”
77
 The WRPA clearly 
states that “an individual who is engaged in foreign worker recruitment must not 
directly or indirectly charge or collect a fee from a foreign worker for finding or 
attempting to find employment for him or her.”
78
 Moreover, section 11 of the WRPA 
regulates the registration of employers wishing to hire TFWs: “no employer shall 
recruit a foreign worker without first registering with the director.”
79
 
In Alberta, TFWs’ recruitment is administered through the Employment 
Agency Business Licensing Regulation.
80
 Section 12(1) of the EABLR states that 
employers are not permitted to require recruitment fees from workers by deducting 
such fees from their salary. Employment agencies must be licensed by the 
government of Alberta,
81
 just as is the case in Manitoba. The Albertan government 
provides helpful online documentation to workers suffering from abuse, as workers’ 
rights are explained in clear words.
82
 Only part of this online documentation is 
translated (into six languages).
83
 However, several language versions of the 
Temporary Foreign Workers: a Guide for Employees
84
 document exist. The Guide 




British Columbia’s legislation requires employment agencies to be 
licensed.
86
 Section 11 of the BC Employment Standards Act prohibits the charging of 
fees which serve to help workers “find a job or to provide information about 
prospective jobs”. A TFW should not be required to pay for immigration assistance as 
a condition of being placed in a job and should not be required to post a bond or pay a 
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deposit to ensure they will finish a work term or employment contract, nor should 
they be required to pay a penalty if they do not. 
In Nova Scotia, the Labour Standards Code
87
 was amended in 2011 to 
include stipulations concerning the licensing of recruiters and the registration of 
employers of foreign workers. Section 89H(1) provides that “[n]o person shall engage 
in foreign worker recruitment unless the person is an individual who holds a licence 
under this Act that authorizes the person to do so.”
88
 Moreover, the employer has to 




In Saskatchewan, the Foreign worker recruitment and immigration services 
Act
90
 also requires foreign recruitment agencies to be licensed.
91
 It also requires the 
employers of foreign nationals to hold a certificate of registration.
92
 The Act also 
prohibits practices such as “tak[ing] possession of or retain[ing] a foreign national’s 
passport or other official document or property”
93
, “threaten[ing] deportation or other 
action for which there is no lawful cause”
94
 or “tak[ing] action against or threaten[ing] 
to take action against a person for participating in an investigation or proceeding by 
any government or law enforcement agency or for making a complaint to any 
government or law enforcement agency.”
95
 Moreover, the Act provides that “no 
person shall, directly or indirectly, charge any person other than an employer a fee or 
expense for recruitment services.”
96
 Thus, employers are prohibited from directly 
requiring a payment, or reducing the wages of a foreign worker, to recover the cost of 
the recruitment.
97
 Finally, the Act provides that all contracts for recruitment services 
must be in writing and written in a clear language. The recruiters must also “take 
reasonable measures to ensure that foreign nationals whose first language is not the 
language of the contract understand the terms and conditions of the contract before 
they enter into the contract.”
98
 
Finally, Ontario has the most recent legislation regarding “staffing businessˮ. 
In 2009, a new chapter was inserted into the Employment Standards Act
99
. It 
contained several new prohibitions; an agency cannot prevent a client from hiring an 
employee, or impose fees on the worker for an allocation of employment.
100
 If the 
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agency violates these dispositions, the employee can be refunded directly.
101
 Ontario 
also enacted the Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in 
Caregivers and Others)
102
 in 2009. Initially, this legislation only regulated the 
recruitment of foreign nationals employed or seeking employment as live-in 
caregivers in the province. However, in 2015 it was amended and renamed the 
Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act: the change expanded the 
application of the legislation to all foreign nationals who, pursuant to an immigration 
or foreign temporary employee program, are employed or seek employment in 
Ontario.
103
 The EPFNA prohibits recruiters from charging foreign nationals any 
fees,
104
 either directly or indirectly; it generally prevents employers from recovering 
or attempting to recover fees from the foreign national;
105
 it prohibits employers and 
recruiters from taking a foreign national’s property, including documents like 
passports or work permits;
106
 it prohibits a recruiter, an employer, or a person acting 
on their behalf from intimidating or penalizing a foreign national for their query into a 
right of an assertion of their rights under the EPFNA;
107
 it requires that recruiters and, 
in some situations, employers, distribute information to foreign nationals which sets 
out workers’ rights under the EPFNA and the Ontario’s Employment Standards Act.
108
 




A question remains: how can Canadian laws extend to activities that occur in 
another jurisdiction? Could we consider lifting the “corporate veil” in order to shift 
the responsibility for unlawful practices to entities located in Canada? In Canada, 
the courts will disregard the separate legal personality of a corporate entity 
where it is completely dominated and controlled and being used as a shield 
for fraudulent or improper conduct; in such cases, the courts may allow to 
lift the “corporate veil.”110 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Buanderie centrale de Montréal, 
determined that “a corporation may be regarded as the alter ego of another 
corporation when there is such a close relationship between them that what apparently 
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concerns one actually pertains to the activities of the other.”
111
 Thus, an undertaking 
is considered the alter ego of another where it can be established that, by virtue of 
very close ties between the two, they are not separate persons. 
In light of the above considerations, it is appropriate to examine the 
legislative framework that governs recruitment activities in Guatemala. 
 
B. The Guatemalan regulatory framework : from formal standards to a 
compliance assessment 
In Guatemala, section 34 of the Labor Code
112
 provides the Guatemalan 
government with legal authority to regulate the recruitment of temporary workers and 
specifically enables the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MINTRAB) with the 
protection workers’ rights abroad. Section 34 specifically establishes MINTRAB’s 
power to authorize the recruiting and departure of workers for jobs abroad, 
stating employment contracts must have the MINTRAB’s written authorization. In 
fact, section 34 explicitly prohibits the execution of contracts without the 
MINTRAB’s authorization.
113
 The contract must establish that all expenses, including 
transportation, housing, and border crossing, are covered by the recruiter or 
employer.
114
 Workers are not to incur any expenses for the placement services offered 
by the recruiter. Additionally, section 34 requires the recruiter or the employer to 
maintain a permanent office in Guatemala City for the duration of the contract
115
 and 
post a bond to guarantee there will be money available for any repatriation costs or 
payment of claims if abuses or breaches of the contract occur.
116
 The Labor Code also 
deals with employers’ representatives who meddle in the foreign employment 
process. It states that the employer is jointly responsible for the actions of their 




Despite the explicit and strong protections contained in section 34 of the 
Labor Code, Guatemala does not specifically regulate temporary migration programs 
that send Guatemalans abroad. Specific regulation is necessary to enable the 
MINTRAB or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to exercise institutional control over 
recruiters in Guatemala. Without clearly identified regulation, there is, simply put, no 
government capacity to ensure that section 34 is implemented and enforced. Since 
2014, Guatemala has been developing its regulation of recruiting agencies in the field 
                                                 
111
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of temporary foreign work.
118
 Various stakeholders, including recruiters, government 
actors, and civil society, have all contributed to the proposed regulations. These 
legislative proposals have yet to yield concrete results. 
 
C. Regulating the recruitment process of TFWs : addressing effectively the 
normative conundrum 
Over time and in different contexts, labour recruitment has “earned a 
reputation as not only ungoverned but ungovernable”. The “normal response” to the 
regulatory gaps that result in the “abuse of migrants” is to call “on governments to 
ratify the International Labour Organization (ILO) and United Nations (UN) 
conventions and translate them into national laws and regulations effectively 
enforced.”
119
 As such, several international conventions and recommendations have 
been developed to protect workers’ rights under the aegis of the ILO and the UN. 
Recruitment issues figure in the ILO’s Migration for Employment Convention
120
 and 
the Private Employment Agencies Convention.
121
 This issue is also mentioned in the 
UN’s International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families.
122
 If several “sending states” have ratified 
these instruments, the vast majority of “receiving States”, such as Canada, have yet to 
ratify them. 
To address the “expansion and mounting complexity of labour migration”,
123
 
in 2005, the ILO adopted the Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-
binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration.
124
 
This instrument seeks to safeguard workers’ rights throughout their migration 
journey, a sojourn which often involves interacting with a variety of actors.
125
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Concerns related to recruitment also figure in this soft-law instrument. Principle 
no. 13 states that “[g]overnments in both origin and destination countries should give 
due consideration to licensing and supervising recruitment and placement services for 
migrant workers in accordance with the [PEAC] and its Recommendation 
(no. 188).”
126
 The principle is followed by guidelines aimed to give it practical effect. 
Among other things, it suggests that governments “implement legislation and policies 
containing effective enforcement mechanisms and sanctions to deter unethical 
practices, including provisions for the prohibition of private employment agencies 
engaging in unethical practices and the suspension or withdrawal of their licences in 
case of violation.”
127
 Although these principles are non-binding, this instrument calls 
“for global labour market membership, a notion that entails, in part, freeing key 
labour protections from the exclusive domain of nation states.”
128
 
Finally, on September 19, 2016 the United Nations General Assembly 
unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,
129
 a 
political declaration that is directed at improving the way in which the international 
community responds to large movements of refugees and migrants. In February 2018, 
a draft version of the “Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migrationˮ was 
published and its sixth objective aims to “facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and 
safeguard conditions that ensure decent work.”
130
 
In September 2016, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human 
Resources, Skills and Social Development issued a report on the Temporary Foreign 
Worker Program. The committee identifies specific areas of concern that should be 
addressed “to better ensure the TFWP functions in an effective manner that is not 
only responsive to labour market needs but that also fully respects the fundamental 
rights of those who use it.”
131
 Amongst the observations brought forward, the 
committee specifically mentions that witnesses identified loopholes in the monitoring 
and enforcement of measures that were in place to “deter unscrupulous recruitment 
practices.”
132
 The committee therefore recommends the creation of an accreditation 
system for recruiters, “which requires compliance with the Temporary Foreign 
Worker Program rules and from which employers could exclusively select.”
133
 If the 
committee’s recommendations are to be acted upon, we believe that close attention 
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should be given to the normative and institutional architecture of the accreditation 
system. 
We believe that explicit provision should be made in the Canadian 
immigration legal framework for the regulation of the foreign worker recruitment 
process. One of the IRPA’s objectives is enable Canada to gain from “the maximum 
social, cultural and economic benefits of immigration”
134
 and “promote international 
justice and security by fostering respect for human rights and by denying access to 
Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks.”
135
 The 
interpretation and the implementation of the IRPA must further “the domestic and 
international interests of Canada”
136
 while ensuring that decisions taken under the Act 
“are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”
137
 and comply 
“with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory.”
138
 
Section 135 of the IRPA states that “[a]n act or omission that would by 
reason of this Act be punishable as an offence if committed in Canada is, if 
committed outside Canada, an offence under this act and may be tried and punished in 
Canada.”
139
 It is therefore probable that activities taking place abroad are subject to 
the IRPA. 
The IRPA should be amended to explicitly regulate the recruitment of TFWs. 
Specific provisions could be made in the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Regulations all “administrative fees” paid to recruiters should be deemed unlawful. 
TFWs should also have a positive right to withdraw from any additional “services” 
offered by recruiters, such as health insurance plans. 
Private entities that offer employment services to Canadian employers should 
be required to register, regardless of whether those services are offered in Canada or 
abroad. To ensure adequate follow-up, employers should have to identify, in the 
Labour Market Impact Assessment, the private entities acting on their behalf. The list 
of private entities that offer employment services should be largely accessible as well 
as the entities charging illegal fees. 
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations should clearly state 
that employers are strictly liable for all unlawful fees paid by the workers, no matter 
the context. As stated previously, recruiters act on behalf of employers. The latter 
should be accountable for the acts of their agents; shared liability should exist “as a 
complement to direct regulation of recruiter, not a replacement.”
140
 In order for this 
policy option to be effective, ESDC’s agents should be mandated to conduct onsite 
audits. 
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*** 
 
In Quebec, few agricultural employers recruit TFWs themselves. The choice 
of countries from which agricultural workers are recruited through is a result of the 
strategies developed by private labour suppliers contracted by employers. These 
labour suppliers generally work in pairs, one operating in the sending country and 
another in Quebec. The results of our mixed-methods research reveal that the 
recruitment of Guatemalan TFWs hired through the Agricultural stream of the TFWP 
is expeditious and that workers must cover various expenses and fees. 
As with other types of migrants, the practices that Guatemalan TFWs are 
confronted with take place in a “vacuum of effective regulation.ˮ We argue that 
despite provincial legislation aimed at regulating the activities of recruiters, the 
Canadian regulatory framework does not comprehensively and fully address unlawful 
conduct that occurs during recruitment. 
Like the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Resources, 
Skills and Social Development, we believe that the IRPA and its regulations must 
address the recruitment process of workers hired through the TFWP. In this article, 
we have sought to propose certain regulatory solutions to this problem. 
Although these measures would allow for a more effective control of 
recruitment processes, some adverse effects would be expected. Where an unlawful 
fee is requested, the responsibility lies with the recruiter, not the TFW. Due to the 
position of power that recruiters enjoy as gatekeepers to jobs in Canada, TFWs have 
no choice but to comply with their demands, licit or otherwise. When such unlawful 
practices are reported, the recruiter should suffer the consequences. TFWs who are 
denied visas are left in a very precarious situation, most likely burdened with debt, 
with no prospect of a job in Canada to pay it off. These dire circumstances send a 
message to other TFWs, warning them not to acknowledge that fees were requested of 
them, further complicating the task of rooting out unlawful practices for authorities. 
